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T
he profession of arms is fundamentally moral in
nature as it implicates foundational values and
principles that have significant impact on the well-
being of others (De Cremer, 2009; Heekeren et al., 2005;
Jones, 1991; Velasuez & Rostankowski, 1985). Perhaps
more than any other profession, the moral decisions and
behaviors made in a military context can have profound
effects on the military decision maker, their subordinates
and peers, their adversaries, and civilians caught in a
conflict (Nilsson, 2010; Robinson, 2009), as well as on
missioneffectivenessandsupportforthemilitary(Stouffer
& Seiler, 2010; Warner & Appenzeller, 2011). Indeed, the
state-granted powers of ultimate destruction mean that
‘‘the military has a unique obligation to be constrained by
moral integrity and competence’’ (Davenport, 1997, p. 3).
Although military operations have always involved
moral dimensions, recent missions have additional com-
plexities in this regard. Current and anticipated future
missionshavebeencharacterizedas‘‘notreally‘war’atall:
but rather as unconventional, asymmetric conflicts with
shadowy, elusive and ill-defined enemies and morally
ambiguous objectives that are more akin to ongoing at-
tempts to combat organized crime, or stop gang warfare,
or identify and arrest drug dealers and human traffickers
than they are to armies defending their nations against
enemy states in conventional war’’ (Lucas, 2009, p. xv;
seealsoRobinson,2009). Insurgents rarelywearuniforms,
retreat into the safety of local populations, and often
adhere to a set of moral values that are not only in-
consistent with, but in fact ‘‘... often [deliberately] play
against the ethical standards that western societies hold
dear’’ (Cossar, 2008, p. 29) in order to provoke dispropor-
tionate retaliation from Western forces. There are also
cultural differences with the wider local population,
creating additional cultural stress (Azari, Dandeker, &
Greenberg, 2010) for military members who have increas-
ing contact with local populations (Riedel, 2008; Warner
& Appenzeller, 2011). Ethnic cleansing and atrocities
among warring factions have become commonplace
(Breed, 1998), and restrictive rules of engagement have
meant that intervening militaries can do little more than
bear witness to the carnage around them (Dallaire, 2002;
Everts, 2000; Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich, & Batres,
1997;Thompson&Gignac,2002;Weisaeth,2003).Finally,
militariesareoften calledupontoassumecombat,humani-
tarian, and stabilization roles all in the same mission.
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(Adler, Litz, & Bartone, 2003), and ethical challenges
(Robinson, 2009). Such added complexity and ambiguity
mean that military personnel are called upon to make
moral decisions under some of the most challenging of
conditions: 1) when the right thing to do is not imme-
diately clear; 2) when two or more important principles
or values support different actions, and 3) when some
harm will result, regardless of the actions taken (Defense
Ethics Program, Department of National Defense, 2012).
Of course, these new operational realities occur within
the context of traditional military stressors. These include
timepressure,incompleteorambiguousinformation,sleep
deprivation, and primitive living conditions (Orasanu &
Backer, 1996; Thompson & McCreary, 2006; Warner &
Appenzeller, 2011). Similarly, fear (Horne, 2004) and the
‘‘recognitionofone’sowndestructivecapacityandconcern
about failing one’s comrades’’ (Orasanu & Backer, 1996;
Banks, 2012) are never far from mind. Together, these
factors create ‘‘the threatening psychological ambiance of
combat’’ (Novaco, Cook, & Sarason, 1983, p. 381).
The effects of physical and mental stress on decision
making are wide-ranging (Hancock & Szalma, 2008),
including a reduced ability to engage in effortful thinking,
a greater influence of emotions, and greater automatic
information processing (Driskell, Salas, & Johnson, 2006;
Kahneman, 2003). Other deficits include an increase
in attentional lapses and magical thinking (where beliefs
conflict with the laws of nature), the narrowing of per-
ceptual focus, short-term memory impairment, and a
greater use of bias and heuristics in decision making
(Artwohl & Christensen, 1997; Chajut & Algom, 2003;
Keinan, 1987, 1994; Keinan, Friedland, & Ben-Porath,
1987; Leach, 2005; Messervey, 2013; Morgan, Doran,
Steffian, Hazlett, & Southwick, 2006; Norenzayan &
Hansen, 2006; Orasanu & Backer, 1996; Wickens, 1987;
Wickens & Flach, 1988). Each of these has the potential
to lead to significant errors in judgment and performance.
Although the effect of stressors on moral decision
making is less understood, recent research shows that
stressors commonplace in military operations may well
affect moral decision making. For instance, sleep depriva-
tion has been associated with decreased ability to re-
cognize a moral issue (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, &
Ghumman, 2011; Kjellevold Olsen, Pallesen, & Eid, 2010)
and longer decision latency*although it did not affect
moral decision qualityat least in one study (Killgoreet al.,
2007). Higher cognitive load (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg,
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008) and reduced self-control (Gino,
Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011) have also been shown
to interfere with certain types of moral judgments and
the recognition of moral issues, respectively. Remarkably,
even feelings of cleanliness (through the act of washing
one’shandsorexposuretowordsassociatedwithcleanliness)
h a v eb e e ns h o w nt oh a v ea ni m p a c to na tl e a s tc e r t a i nm o r a l
judgments (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008).
Together, this evidence underscores the importance
of exploring the role of stress on military moral deci-
sion processes. It also lends credence to the calls of
researchers who question an exclusive reliance on tra-
ditional models of moral decision making that are based
exclusively on rational, effortful cognition (Rogerson,
Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011). In-
deed, most recent conceptual advances in the area are
explicitly dual process models that integrate the cognitive
and emotional aspects of moral decision making and
acknowledge that ethical decision making may be driven
by emotion and automatic decision-making processes,
at least some of the time (Cushman, Young, & Hauser,
2006; Greene, 2007, 2009; Haidt, 2001). The dual proces-
sing approach certainly seems more relevant, as is at
least sometimes the case that military moral dilemmas
need to be resolved rapidly in emerging environments
of threat where immediate affective appraisal is likely to
dominate rational ethical thinking.
A focus on military ethics seems especially warranted
given the media and government reports of the recent
(although still relatively rare) incidents of unethical beha-
vior in themilitaries ofmanycountries, including Canada,
Britain, Australia, the United States, and the Netherlands,
to mention just a few (Banks, 2012; De Graff & Van
den Berg, 2010; Government of Canada, 1997; Rayment,
2011; Robinson, 2009; Santow, 2011). Concerns in the
wake of events such as Abu Ghraib led the US military
to commission groundbreaking research (Mental Health
Advisory Team (MHAT)-IV, Castro & McGurk, 2007;
see also MHAT-V, 2008) that was the first to system-
atically investigate the battlefield ethical attitudes and
behaviors of US soldiers and marines deployed in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The unsettling results of that study,
though well-known, bear repeating:
Less than half of soldiers and marines believed
that noncombatants should be treated with dignity
and respect, and well over a third believed that
torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow
team member. About 10% of soldiers and marines
reported mistreating an Iraqi noncombatant when
it wasn’t necessary, either by destroying their pri-
vate property or by hitting or kicking them. Less
than half of soldiers or marines would report a team
member for unethical behavior, instead preferring
to handle it themselves at the team level. (Castro &
McGurk, 2007, pp. 29 30)
Although disturbing, these findings were equally
revealing in terms of beginning to illuminate a link
between unethical attitudes, behaviors, and stress. Speci-
fically, those soldiers who were more likely to have
reported unethical attitudes or behaviors were also twice
as likely to screen positive for a mental health problem,
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higher levels of anger. Level of combat exposure was
also associated with unethical attitudes and behaviors.
Specifically, soldiers and marineswhose units had suffered
casualties, or who had handled dead bodies or human
remains, were more likely to report that they had verbally
abused noncombatants, destroyed civilian property un-
necessarily, and in the case of the marine sample, to have
reported physically abusing a noncombatant than soldiers
and marines whose units did not suffer a casualty or
handle human remains (Castro & McGurk, 2007; Warner
et al., 2011).
One explanation of these findings is that higher levels
of stress associated with deployment events led to ethical
violations*an explanation consistent with the emerging
laboratory studies of the effects of stressors on moral
decision making cited above. Others, however, have
suggested that such psychological conflict and suffering
is the result of an individual perpetrating, witnessing,
or failing to prevent actions that contravene his or her
fundamentalmoral beliefs(Cossar,2008;Litz etal.,2009),
and/orsocietal norms for military personnel(Grossman &
Christensen, 2007; Nadelson, 2005). A precondition for
such moral injuries (Litz et al., 2009) is the recognition
of the event as a severe violation of deeply held values that
will lead to conflict and stress. However, it is the
attribution made concerning the underlying causes of
the event that will be necessary for moral injury to ensue.
Specifically, if a soldier believes that the causes of the
behavior are deemed to be global (as opposed to context
specific), internal (i.e., related to a flaw in their character),
and stable (i.e., enduring), moral injury, described as
alternating between intrusive thoughts and emotions
such as guilt or shame and increasingly frantic efforts
to avoid same, will ensue. This pattern will play out
repeatedly and be associated with long-term conflict and
distress. ‘‘The more time passes, the more service members
willbeconvincedandconfidentthatnotonlytheiractions,
but they are unforgiveable ...[and] will fail to see a path
toward renewal and reconciliation; they will fail to forgive
themselves and experience self-condemnation’’ (Litz et al.,
2009, p. 698). This evocative description is entirely con-
sistent with the wider literature documenting the impor-
tance of the quality of posttrauma narrative on a person’s
self-evaluation, and the importance of building a construc-
tive and coherent meaning regarding the event in order to
process it in a constructive manner (Janoff-Bulman, 1992;
Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Taylor, 1983; Tuval-Mashiach
et al., 2004).
Debates concerning cause and effect relationships
notwithstanding*and indeed both explanations are likely
to be true at times*results such as these make clear that
militaries must remain vigilant about operational ethics.
This vigilance is certainly fundamental to militaries’ duty
of care to ensure the psychological well-being of indivi-
dual military members sent into harm’s way. However, as
noted earlier, such vigilance is also important because
the unethical actions of even a few military personnel
reduce level of host and home country public support for
the mission, undermining operational legitimacy and
effectiveness (Stouffer & Seiler, 2010). Finally, given the
complexity and myriad stressors inherent in modern
operations, there is a strong case to be made that even
greater skill in moral judgment, decision making, and
action is required to maintain operational effectiveness
and soldier well-being in future missions.
Speaking on this issue, a recent volume by leading
international military ethicists questioned whether exist-
ing military ethics education and training have kept apace
of these new ethical complexities (Carrick, Connelly,
& Robinson, 2009). Indeed, in the view of these ex-
perts, the vast majority of military ethical education has
remained rooted in the traditions and value systems of
conventional war-fighting, rather than updating curricu-
lums to incorporate these emerging ethical issues. More-
over, despite growing evidence that demonstrates a
bidirectional link between stress and ethical behaviors,
it continues to be the case that mental health training
(Stress and Coping or Resilience) and ethics training are
developed and delivered completely, independent of each
other. However, it may well be that the mental health
training becomes particularly relevant as one confronts
ethical decisions and likewise the impact of ethical
dilemmas on well-being should be underscored during
ethics training.
Such concerns are supported by other empirical find-
ings in Castro and McGurk’s research. Although approxi-
mately 80% of the soldiers and marines reported receiving
ethics training concerning the proper treatment of non-
combatants, about 25% of them also reported that they
faced ethical situations in Iraq in which they were not sure
how to respond. Moreover, Warner et al. (2011) reported
that most soldiers were unsatisfied by traditional Power-
Point presentation approaches to operational ethics pre-
paration. Certainly, it seems patently unfair to expect
military personnel to respond ethically if they are not
provided the most relevant and effective preparation for
current missions (Robinson, 2009).
The question then becomeswhat should ethics prepara-
tion for contemporary military missions look like, and
what foundational principles should guide its develop-
ment? Certainly, it would need to develop and exercise the
ability to recognize a moral issue (i.e., moral awareness),
and moral decision-making skills. Given the reality of
militaryoperations,itmustavoidanoverrelianceonexclu-
sively cognitive-based models; it must address the role of
stress and situational factors on moral decision making
and behaviors, and provide practice in order to mitigate
these effects. Indeed, opportunities to practice under-
taking moral behaviors, perhaps especially in situations
Battlefield ethics training
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might be constructed to involve some operational chal-
lenges is likely critical. Importantly, it would need to
accomplish these objectives in ways that will be meaningful
and immediately relevant to a majority of military
personnel who undertake the training.
Several recent sources reinforce these principles and
provide additional insights on how to achieve these
objectives. For instance, Johnson (2011) outlined several
relevant training objectives for contemporary missions:
1) Increased moral awareness: Service members will be
able to recognize the moral aspects of an operational
setting; service members will be able to understand
the relevant moral dimensions in an operational
setting; service members will be able to see the moral
implications of the decision;
2) Exercise moral judgment: Service members will be
able to identify appropriate levels of moral respon-
sibility in situations of moral ambiguity or complex-
ity; service members will be able to demonstrate the
recognition of different*sometimes competing*
cultural moral systems, as active, though not
necessarily binding, within different areas of respon-
sibility; service members will be able to identify an
appropriate understanding of their role in the
encounter and their range of potential responses.
3) Increased confidence and mastery: Service members
will develop their confidence in confronting morally
complex situations;
She further proposed ‘‘moral resiliency training,’’ a
highly interactive, carefully constructed and guided ap-
proach consisting of decision-making games, hot washes,
historical and personal case studies to take place within
resident officer professional military education (PME).
Importantly, Johnson (2011) advocated that scenarios
should be morally ambiguous or complex so that service
members are able ‘‘to confront the absence of ‘right’
answers, ...[and understand that] they may not [always]
be able to resolve the dilemma, solve the problem, or ‘do
the right thing’’’ (p. 279), as there are times when this
may be the case in operations (Thompson, Adams, &
Thomson, 2008). Personnel must have the opportunity to
acknowledge that this may be the case and to work out
a range of possible responses to such circumstances
(Robinson, 2007). Moreover, given the diverse cultures
increasingly encountered in contemporary missions,
‘‘training must cultivate mechanisms within service mem-
berstolivein environmentswithdifferent,evencompeting
moral systems ...[including] specific strategies for mana-
ging the moral disconnect that members are likely to face
during their deployments’’ (Johnson, 2011, p. 277).
She also argued that PME provides the time for critical
thinking skills to analyze moral challenges, using three
key psychological processes: situational reconstruction,
in which individuals revisit the experience in order to
gain perspective; focusing, in which individuals explore
their physical reactions to the event; and compensatory
self-improvement, in which individuals envision what
actions they can now take to develop confidence in their
ability to take future action. Also, the peer insights and
support, mentor supervision, and access to mental health
professionals within resident PME, would allow officers
to ‘‘create an environment in which officers can process
past morally traumatic events, prepare themselves for the
morally traumatic situations they may experience during
future deployments, and learn how to prepare their
subordinates to do the same’’ (p. 278).
Note that Johnson’s suggestion that PME provides the
opportunity to process past traumatic events also implies the
importance of mental health in this area. Indeed, the issue of
the impact of prior traumatic exposures bears some special
attention.Forinstance,itsuggeststhatthe‘‘psychicnoise’’of
unprocessed trauma/or symptoms may well have an impact
on ethical decisions. Despite Johnson’s optimistic assessment
ofthevalueofrevisitingeventsinPME,itisalsothecasethat
if prior events remain psychically scarring that processing
of past traumatic events may be more difficult. This can
be further complicated by a coping strategy of cognitive
avoidance in order to suppress the earlier memory. There is
no doubt that thesewillhavea significant effect on aperson’s
moraldecision-makingability.Suchapatterncouldhighlight
particular at-risk individuals or groups who may be more
vulnerable in this regard. In particular, it may suggest the
necessity for engaged leadership (Warner & Appenzeller,
2011) who are attuned to the attitudes and behaviors of their
soldiersaftertraumaticevents suchasthelossof acomrade.
1
Second, in light of the serious issues illuminated by the
MHAT-IV and MHAT-V studies, the US military devel-
oped battlefield ethics training to be administered during
a deployment (Warner et al., 2011). The training, occur-
ring 7 8 months into the year-long deployment, involved
viewing selected movie clips that depicted military moral
dilemmas involving violations similar to those highlighted
by the MHAT findings (e.g., treatment of noncombatants,
and reporting of ethical failures). This was followed by
semi-standardized (i.e., key discussion points and critical
questions were provided) leader-guided small group dis-
cussions of the ethical issues raised and the ways in which
these issues might be addressed. A large-scale program
evaluation spoke to the program’s apparent success.
Results showed statistically significant decreases in re-
ports of unethical attitudes and behaviors related to the
treatment of noncombatants and civilian property, sig-
nificant decreases in the reports of witnessing unethical
behaviors by other soldiers, and significant increases in
soldiers’ willingness to report the ethical violations of
1The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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MHAT responses. Finally, analyses revealed the major
predictor of the majority of unethical attitudes and be-
haviors to be amount of combat exposure rather than
mental distress per se, although PTSD and time outside
the wire continued to be somewhat related to cursing and
yelling at noncombatants, even after the effects of combat
exposure were accounted for.
These are approaches undoubtedly useful in addressing
two points in the continuum of moral preparation for
military operations: PME and during a deployment.
However, several noted military ethicists also make a
compelling argument for the importance of an opera-
tional ethics training component as part of soldiers’ high-
intensity preparation for operations: ‘‘[E]thics education
should not be seen as something for the classroom only’’
(Robinson, 2009, p. 9). Lucas went even further, noting
that ‘‘ungrounded and untested raw intuitions can differ
substantially, and provide little in the way of guidance to
individuals facing stark choices in the heat of conflict’’
(Lucas, 2009, p. xii). Similar thinking also led McMaster
(2009) to conclude that effective ethical preparation
must include ‘‘tough, realistic training appropriate for
the environment that soldiers will face’’ (p. 15), a concern
particularly relevant given the myriad stressors, ambigu-
ity, and intensity of complex modern military operations.
When considering the issue of integrating moral
decision-making training into high-intensity training en-
vironments, several lessons from Thompsonand McCreary’s
(2006) mental readiness training are also relevant. Their
approach was developed specifically in response to some
of the limitations of traditional military stress manage-
ment training, including the reliance on lecture formats
and PowerPoint briefings delivered in settings distinct
from operational training, and presented by mental health
professionals with little operational experience. The result
of this traditional stress management approach was
that important information was often seen as minimally
relevant to the ongoing experience of deployed forces,
presented in a format that was not engaging, and pre-
sented by instructors who lacked operational credibility;
all of which ultimately hampered the effectiveness of these
programs (Thompson & Pasto `, 2003). In contrast, the
mental readiness approach is based on a more seamless
integration of skills application into selected, high inten-
sity, military training environments. The idea was to embed
lessons and training points in operationally relevant
contexts so that skill acquisition and rehearsal are more
intrinsically applicable and salient to soldiers, the skills
more contiguously practiced, and the results more im-
mediately experienced. Based in the cognitive behavioral
tradition, the training approach seeks to emphasize the
interconnection between cognitive, physiological, and
emotional systems; acknowledging that arousal in one
system can lead to increased arousal in the remaining
systems through a series of feedback loops (Mischel,
2004). This principle clearly echoes the military findings
best illustrated by the MHAT data that indicate a link
betweenstressanddecisionmaking,andincorporatingthe
potential for bidirectional effects (high stress leading to
moral decision-making errors, i.e., Castro & McGurk,
2007, and/or moral decision-making errors leading to
higher and longer-term stress outcomes, i.e., Litz et al.,
2009). And indeed most recently, concerted efforts by
Canadian Forces’ mental health professionals have trans-
formed traditional mental health training into Resilience
Training, using the ‘‘Big 4’’ from sports psychology*goal
setting, mental rehearsal/visualization/self-talk and arou-
sal reduction/tactical breathing (Crust & Azadi, 2010).
Just as these skills quiet the noise of stresswhen an athlete
faces challenges, it is designed in part, to assist soldiers
when facing the enemy (Department of National Defense,
2013). We also believe that such skills may also play a role
in quieting the surrounding psychic noise in order to make
anethicaldecision,althoughthisisahypothesisthatneeds
to be confirmed with empirical research.
Integrating these various sources then, such scenario-
based moral decision-making training would involve
carefully constructed scenarios designed to exercise
specific moral decision-making challenges that would
occur in selected high-intensity training environments.
Finally, predeployment training is an ideal place to in-
tegrate compelling moral decision-making challenges,
wherever possible garnered from the operational experi-
ence of veterans of relevant recent missions, into the
overall training objectives of such confirmation exercises.
This would allow for moral decision-making processes to
be used under close to real-life stress conditions, and also
provide in-situ experience in considering moral implica-
tions and options, and balancing these in the context of
multiple, potentially competing, operational objectives.
Integration of moral decision-making feedback within
after-action reviews, feedback from exercise mentors, and
discussions among unit members all would be critical to
deepening an understanding of moral decision making
during the intensity of operations in general; demonstrat-
ing how stressors may affect that decision making, and
considering the issues and responses relevant to the
specific moral scenarios selected for inclusion in training.
The careful selection of moral challenges, either drawn
directly from or tied to recent operational experiences, is
common to both to principles underlying the approaches
used by Johnson and by Warner et al.
Although beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
in detail, clearly the influences of peers and leaders are
critical to the success of this approach. Seminal social
psychological theory and research has made clear how
(often-related) phenomenon such as obedience and the role
of authority (Milgram, 1963; Blass, 1991), peer pressure
(Asch, 1951), groupthink (Janis, 1971), social comparison
Battlefield ethics training
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influence (Kelman, 1958), and diffusion of responsibility
and bystander effects (Darley & Latane, 1968) can
profoundly affect a variety of attitudes and behavior,
findings echoed by military ethicist Cossar (2008). ‘‘Even
though the individual soldier may believe in ethical
treatment of others, it is easy to get pulled into the killing.
Fear, authority, dehumanization, and indoctrination are
just some of the factors that may lead people to react
against their will’’ (p. 31). In addition, interactions with
peers typically involve a large emotional component
which, magnified by the heat of battle, further triggers
automatic processing. For various reasons then, impor-
tant others may often outweigh the influence of moral
principles in such situations (Betan & Stanton, 1999) and
affect evaluations of the unethical behavior of significant
others (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2008) especially in
cases where the resultant harm is not clear, immediate,
and direct; and when there has been a slow erosion of a
culture of ethics within a group; all heuristic biases that
could be further heightened under stressful conditions.
A related but crucial issue in this regard is the dilemma
for the individual who raises a moral or ethical criticism
of his colleagues in a combat environment. Given that
these may lead to legal investigations, it is important that
such scenarios are equally addressed. The potential
alienation and bullying of individuals who raise complex
moral issues in the combat environment need to be an
integrated part of any effective program.
Although predeployment training is obviously too late
for a first introduction to these issues, the scenario-based
training experience of integrating at least some of these
social influences at play in terms of operational ethics
maybeonewaytofurther mitigatetheirpotentialnegative
impacts while fostering their positive effects. Consistent
with the empirical findings of Warner and colleagues,
those principles that cannot be directly integrated into
the moral scenario must be dealt with explicitly in post-
scenario unit discussions, led by unit leaders and/or
trainers with the requisite operational experience.
In the final analyses, the current approach is predicated
on the actual rehearsal of important moral decision
processes, in contexts as close as possible to operational
environments, with all of their attendant stresses in ac-
cordance with Robinson (2009), Lucas (2009), and
McMaster (2009). As with any skill, rehearsal is funda-
mental to building a better understanding of relevant
issues and responses for the best course of action. This
further builds a sense of certainty, control, and confidence
(Cossar, 2008; Johnson, 2011), while reducing interference
from competing responses (Driskell et al., 2006), which
maybeparticularlyimportantincomplextasks(Keinan&
Friedland, 1996) such as those inherent in recent missions.
This enables valuable learning in realistic environments,
butalsoallowsforthepossibilityoflearningintheabsence
of true harm to self, others, or the mission. For all of these
reasons then we believe that integrating moral situations
within high-intensity military training settings should
contribute to the development of the ‘‘mental and emo-
tional conditioning needed to respond [appropriately to
moral issues] in combat’’ (Johnson, 2011, p. 279).
Concluding thoughts
We have presented evidence from a variety of sources to
make the case that the integration of ethical scenarios
within high-intensity field training will benefit soldier
psychological well-being and operational effectiveness.
However, we are quick to point out that this approach
should not be treated as a panacea. Indeed, one explicit
objective of the approach that is outlined here (and of all
moral education and training) is increased moral aware-
ness. Ignorance can be bliss: thus a potential risk of this,
and indeed all engaging moral training and education,
is the real possibility that some soldiers may be more
vulnerable as a result of this training, at least initially.
Itbearsrepeatingtherefore,thatengagedleadersandpeers
are invaluable to keeping watch for signs of confusion
ordistress in peers, similar to that undertaken with respect
tomanytechnicalmilitaryskills.Intheend,webelievethat
the benefits accrued by the careful development of moral
decision-making skills in response to relevant operational
scenarios, practiced with the leaders and peers with whom
one will deploy, in realistic, but nonetheless safe condi-
tions (where ‘‘do overs’’ are possible), is anticipated to
mitigate many of these risks, while better addressing the
significant and long-term liabilities that remain if such
approaches are not adopted.
We are not advocating that conventional moral educa-
tion be abandoned. On the contrary, PME lays an im-
portant, thoughtful grounding in the values and factors
that must be taken into consideration in military ethics
(Bradley, 2010), and may be particularly important in
settings where rational and deliberative decision-making
processes are possible. What we are suggesting here is
that these educationally-based approaches alone are not
enough.Similarly,militaryethicistscontinuetohaveacru-
cialplaceineducationandaspartoftheoperationalethics
training team. However, within high-intensity scenario-
based training, we believe that the important issues as-
sociated with operational ethics may resonate more if
delivered by military personnel with acknowledged opera-
tional experience and credibility. Given the importance of
moral behaviors to soldier well-being and mission effec-
tiveness, the ideal approach would involve a deliberate,
integrated program of moral preparation for operations
including PME activities discussed by Johnson (2011),
focused high-intensity predeployment training outlined
here, and in-theater training as developed by Warner et al.
(2011).
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have addressed the issue of operational ethics wherever
they can; for instance, encouraging trainees to think about
the moral aspects of particular situations. What we pro-
pose here is an expansion of often ad hoc opportunities
to a more systematic and seamless integration of moral
decision-making training within relevant high-intensity
military predeployment training scenarios. In this way,
operational ethics training objectives more explicit and
demonstrate organizational commitment to this objective*
indeed training of this nature will most certainly fail if
training staff, peers, and particularly unit leaders and the
organization does not seem to endorse it.
There is also no doubt that what we are outlining here
adds burdens to military training systems and schedules
that are already overstretched in providing currently man-
dated training. The approach requires that course desig-
ners and instructors pay increasing attention to effectively
incorporating moral decision making into selected train-
ing, in addition to the wide range of other objectives
they are already expected to cover. Furthermore, as the
most powerful training would take place with scenarios
taken, or combining elements from theater after-action
reports, it will also require that lessons learned collection
must be expanded to include gathering of relevant moral
and ethical decision-making challenges in operations, and
greatercommunication betweenlessons learned and train-
ing design personnel. Finally, we acknowledge that we
are suggesting these additions against the current back-
dropofsizablecutstodefensebudgets,withtheirincreased
pressure on military organizations to reduce training time
and costs. The hope is that the focus on the integration
of this approach into selected ongoing training activities
will reduce at least some of the associated time and finan-
cial costs in the long run.
In fact, some militaries have recently integrated moral
decision-making challenges into selected high-intensity
traininginamannerconsistentwithwhatwehaveoutlined
here. For instance, the Canadian Forces adopted such
an approach in the wake of the difficult ethical challenges
arising within the international mission in Afghanistan.
The Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) in-
jected a series of ethical scenarios into Exercise Maple
Guardian, a 3-week, complex, large-scale, fully immersive,
live-action field training event that was designed to re-
plicate the conditions as much as possible and was the
culminating collective training event for the Canadian
Battle Group prior to deployment to Afghanistan.
The ethical injects took place while troops were im-
mersed in this high-intensity training environment, patrol-
ling, assisting with reconstruction, and/or mentoring
members of the Afghan National Police or Army. Mem-
bers at any level could encounter a woman being beaten,
or hear of sexual abuse, hazing, and/or theft by some of
the Afghani security forces. Exercise controllers determine
how effectively the inject was handled by all members of
theprimarytrainingaudience(PTA):Doestheincidentget
reported or responded to properly at every level? If there
are shortfalls in the reaction, the exercise controllers can
eitherrepeattheevent,insertanotherethicalinject,orstop
the action to talk to the leadership concerning the training
objective and appropriate reactions. This is then explained
to the soldiers directly involved in the event and is part
of the more formal debriefing of the PTA. Colonel Bernd
Horn, then Chief of Staff of the Land Force Doctrine and
Training System, summed up the intent of this training:
This ensures that we put a practical test to all the
theory education and training. We ensure that they
understand the meaning of the words and that they
have an obligation to do something. It also provides
a vehicle whereby we can reinforce the proper
behavior and we can also correct behavior that we
think might not be as efficient or effective as we
would have liked.
Testimony at the Proceedings of the Canadian
Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights,
October 19, 2009.
In conclusion, although intense, realistic training is a
part of every military culture, what appears to be lacking,
and what we are advocating here, is the careful construc-
tionandeffectiveintegrationof,andpracticein,keyaspects
ofmoraldecisionmakingwithinthesehigh-intensityopera-
tional training settings. This will ensure that lessons and
training points, skill acquisition, and rehearsal are more
intrinsically applicable and salient to soldiers, the skills
more contiguously practiced, and the results more im-
mediately experienced in operationally relevant contexts.
It is also intended to better ensure that moral dimensions
will be activated and considered, and that moral behaviors
will be well-rehearsed by the time soldiers are confronted
with the myriad intense stressors and ethical challenges
that are part of modern, high intensity, complex missions.
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